This account states that by September 2010, these leads followed a courier to the Abbottabad compound, where the U. In August 2010, a former Pakistani intelligence officer approached the U. embassy station chief in Islamabad and offered to reveal bin Laden's location, in return for the million reward, according to a retired senior U. The BND informed the CIA that bin Laden was in Pakistan, and Bild am Sonntag states that the CIA then found his "precise location" through a courier.
The White House and CIA director John Brennan stated that the process began with a fragment of information unearthed in 2002, resulting in years of investigation. According to journalist Seymour Hersh and NBC News, however, the U. was tipped off about bin Laden's location by a Pakistani intelligence officer who offered details of where the Pakistani Intelligence Service held him in detention in exchange for a bounty. In May 2015 the German newspaper Bild am Sonntag reported that Germany's Federal Intelligence Service (BND) was aware that bin Laden was in Pakistan with the knowledge of Pakistani intelligence services.
If you don't have time to read the entire piece, skim the highlighted sections and don't miss chapter XIII which presents undeniable proof of cults made up of psychopaths bent on controlling our world.
You will learn how they are able to keep all of this out of the eye of the public.
The operation, code-named Operation Neptune Spear, was carried out in a CIA-led operation, with Joint Special Operations Command, commonly known as JSOC, coordinating the Special Mission Units involved in the raid. forces took bin Laden's body to Afghanistan for identification, then buried him at sea within 24 hours of his death in accordance with Islamic tradition.), told her that a senior U. official had told him that the United States had direct evidence that Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) chief, Lt. Ahmad Shuja Pasha, knew of bin Laden's presence in Abbottabad, but ISI, Pasha, and officials in Washington all denied this. Der Spiegel questioned the veracity of the report, produced in the midst of a scandal over BND and NSA collaboration. official had stated that by 2002, interrogators had heard uncorroborated claims about an al-Qaeda courier with the kunya Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti (sometimes referred to as Sheikh Abu Ahmed from Kuwait).
In addition to SEAL Team Six, participating units under JSOC included the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne), aka "Night Stalkers," and operators from the CIA's Special Activities Division, which recruits heavily from former JSOC Special Mission Units. According to the earlier official version of his identification from a U. official, identification of al-Qaeda couriers was an early priority for interrogators at CIA black sites and the Guantanamo Bay detention camp, because bin Laden was believed to communicate through such couriers while concealing his whereabouts from al-Qaeda foot soldiers and top commanders. One of those claims came from Mohammed al-Qahtani, a detainee interrogated for 48 days more or less continuously between November 23, 2002, and January 11, 2003.
It uses highly reliable sources with links to verify almost everything presented.
Specifically, more novel information flows to individuals through weak rather than strong ties.
In philosophy, reality is the state of things as they actually exist, rather than as they may appear or might be imagined.
When confronted with Ghul's account, Mohammed maintained his original story.
He told CIA interrogators that bin Laden's courier was a man named Maulawi Abd al-Khaliq Jan and denied knowing al-Kuwaiti.